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SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON



Movember 20, 1947.

HEMORANDUM


To: The Acting Secretary

The attached memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence, dated Movember 10, 1947, on the subject of new MSC Intelligence Directives, drafts of which were enclosed, has been given careful study in the light of the changes required by the enactment of the Mational Security Act and the passage of time. Our analysis of the proposed new Directives leads us to the tentative conclusions that (a) in a number of important respects they fail to include certain basic principles, embraced in the MMA Directives, which are of continuing validity, and (b) in other respects they are at variance with certain of those principles and with the intent of the Mational Security Act.

Since the establishment of the Central Intelligence Croup under authority contained in the President's letter of January 22, 1246, there has been continued effort to establish a practical system by which the Director of Central Intelligence can meet his responsibilities toward over-all coordination of the intelligence activities of the several intelligence agencies of the Government, and, at the same time, those a sencies can fulfill their departmental and interdepartmental responsibilities. As a result of this effort the NIA Directives, including the proposed Directive advanced in IAP 1/2, were progressively evolved. Although those Directives are not considered perfect or complete, I believe that, with certain modifications, they could be used as a satisfactory basis from which to proceed toward accomplishing the desired coordination. I further believe that the omissions from the proposed new MSC Directives, coupled with the parts at variance with the old Directives, not only mullify much of the progress already made toward the solution of the problem, but raise the issue of establishing co-picte control of all intelligence activity of the Government in a single authority under the MSC.

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I believe that it was not the intent of the Congress, as expressed in the National Security Act, to establish a single head for all Pederal intelligence agencies.

In addition to the proposed new Directives going, in my opinion, beyond the intent of the Concress, I submit further that to establish a single head for all governmental intelligence agencies would not be a desirable method for coordinating the intelligence activities of the hovernment, so long as departmental intelligence activities are to continue, because (a) it would necessarily impede the direct and immediate response of departmental intelligence organizations to the operational requirements of their department heads; (b) it would place the chiefs of departmental intelligence organizations in the impractical situation of facing two lines of authority, and (c) it identifies the principle of coordination with command and control functions rather than with those functions of initiative, clarification, and cooperative action among equals which form the true meaning of the term.


I cannot, therefore, concur in the proposed ISC Directives presented with the memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence. Specific objections, which call attention to the omissions and variations tetween the principles contained in the MIA Directives (including the proposed Directive contained in IAD 1/2), and the proposed MSC Directives, are set forth in the attached Tab A.

In lieu of the proposed 730 Directives forwarded with the demorandum of Hovember 10, 1947, we subdit herewith, as Tab E through H, recommended draft proposels for H30 Directives to establish policies for the coordination of Jovernmental intelligence activities and the production of national intelligence.


W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

Attachments:

Tab A through Tab E (enumerated in Ditle Page 1)



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LEIGRAFDUM FOR SPECIAL ASSISTATE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, GENERAL STAFF, U. S. ARLY

CHIEF OF HAVAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, HEADQUARTERS, U. S. AIR FORCE
DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AND INTILLIGENCE, ATOMIC EVERGY CONSISSION

Subject: Explanatory Lemorandum About New NSC Intelligence Directives Replacing Old NTA Directives

- 1. On 26 September 1917, at the first meeting of the National Security Council, the Director of Central Intelligence was directed to submit within 60 days appropriate revisions of old NIA directives and supplements (CIG directives). At the suggestion of the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, the proposed I'SC intilligence directives have been confined to matters of policy in consonance with the 1917 Act, the implementing details to be placed in directives issued by the Director of Central Intelligence.
- Accordingly, all the former NTA and CTG directives have been carefully reviewed. The enclosed revisions are transmitted herewith for your concurrence or comment and will be discussed at an early meeting.
- 3. An effort has been made to present the previously adopted essential policies in logical sequence, in consonance with the National Security Act of 1947.
- 4. For your convenience, the proposed LSC directives and related DCI directives are listed hereunder with references to former directives from which they are derived:
 - a. Proposed NSC Intelligence Directive No. 1

This is a consolidation of the functions, policies and objectives included in NIA Directives 1 and 5, with minor revision in conformity with the provisions of the National Security Act.

- b. Proposed Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/1
- Paragraph 1 derives its substance from paragraph ha, NIA Directive No. 5.

Paragraph 2 derives its substance from NIA Directive No. 10.

c. Proposed DCI Directive 1/2

This is a consolidation of the revision of MA Birective No. 9, and an agreement reached between the AEC and CIA.


d. Proposed DCI Directive 1/3

Derived from paragraph hb, MIA Directive No. 5.

e. Proposed DCI Directive 1/4

Derived from JEDB 19/2, which was approved by the Chairpan, Joint Research and Development Board and the Director of Central Intelligence.





- (1) From DCI to Secretaries of War and Navy, dated 2 November 1946; Subject, "Mashington Document Center."
- (2) From DCI to Secretaries of War and Mavy, dated 27 November 1946; Subject, Wlashington Document Center. $^{\rm th}$
- (3) From DI, TDCE, to DCI, dated 20 March 1917; Subject, "German Military Documents Section and Special Documents Section, ID, VDCS."
- (L) From DI, NDOS, to DCI, dated 23 May 1917; Subject, "German Hilitary Document Section and Special Documents Section, ID, NDOS."

g. Proposed DCI Directive 1/6

Derives its substance from CIG Directive No. 15 and the supplement thereto.

h. Proposed MSC Intelligence Directive No. 2

Derived from a consolidation of pertinent items in paragraph ? of the President's letter, NIA Directive No. 1 and (NA Directive No. 11, as revised by decision of the Executive Secretary of the NSC.

i. Proposed NSC Intelligence Directive No. 3

Is a consolidation of NIA Directive No. 7 and CIG Directive No. 16 entitled "Flan for the Coordination of Biographic Intelligence."

No. 7. Paragraph la derives its substance from paragraph la, KIA Directive No. 7.

Paragraph lb is a new paragraph intended to define more clearly the proper allocation for collection of economic and scientific intelligence.

Paragraph 2 is substantially the same as paragraph 1b of NTA Directive κc . 7.

Paragraph 3 is a rewording for clarification of paragraph $1\underline{c}$ of MIA Directive No. 7.

Paragraph h is substantially the same as paragraph h of NIA Directive No. 7.


Paragraph 5 is a rewording for clarification of paragraph le of NIA Directive No. 7.

Paragraph 6 derives its substance from paragraph 2 NIA Directive

Paragraph 7 is substantially the same as paragraph of NIA Directive No. 7.

Paragraph 8 is the same as paragraph to of NiA Directive No. 7.

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j. Proposed DCI Directive 3/1

This is substantially a consolidation of CIG Directive No. 16 entitled "Plan for the Coordination of Biographic Intelligence," and CIG Directive No. 18 entitled "Coordination of Collection Activities," eliminating those parts which duplicate contents of the proposed NSC Intelligence Directive No. 3.

k. Proposed MSC Intelligence Directive No. h

Derived from paragraph 1 and k, NIA Directive No. 8.

5. With the presentation of these proposed MSC intelligence directives to the Council for adoption, the Council will be requested to take the following action on MIA and DIG directives:

NIA Directive No. 1 - Policies and Procedures Coverning the Central Intelligence Group. Rescind as replaced by MSC intelligence directives.

MIA Directive No. 2 - Organization and Functions of the Central Intelligence Group. Rescind as obsolete.

MIA Directive No. 3 - KIA Views on Proposed Executive Order "Directing the Cooperation of Government Agencies in the Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States." Rescind as obsolete.

. NIA Directive No. 4 - Policy on Liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit. Rescind as obsolete.

MA Directive No. 5 - Functions of the Director of Central Intelligence. Rescand as replaced by NSC intelligence directives.

MIA Directive No. 6 - Provision for Coordinating the Acquisition of Foreign Publications. Rescind as inappropriate under the National Security Act of 1947.

MLA Directive No. 7 - Coordination of Collection Activities. Rescind as replaced by NSC intelligence directives.

NIA Directive No. 8 - National Intelligence Requirements. Rescind as replaced by MSC intelligence directives.

MTA Directive No. 9 - Coordination of Intelligence Activities Related to Foreign Atomic Energy Developments and Potentialities. Rescind as replaced by MSC intelligence directives.

MIA Directive No. 10 - Employment of Reserve Officers as Agents. Rescind as replaced by MSC intelligence directives.


MIA Directive No. 11 - Action by the Intelligence Advisory Board on Matters Submitted to the National Intelligence Authority. Rescind as replaced by ISC intelligence directives.

CIG Directive No. 1 - Survey of the Activities of the Strategic Services Unit. Rescind as obsolete.

CIG Directive No. 2 - Survey of the Functions of Monitoring Press and Propaganda Broadcasts of Foreign Powers. Rescind as obsolete.

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CTG Directive No. 3 - Survey of Facilities for Collecting Foreign Intuiligence Information by Clandestine Lethods. Rescind as obsolete.

CIG Directive No. 4 - Survey of Coverage of the Foreign Language point the United States. Rescind as obsolete.

CIG Directive No. \S - Interim Survey of the Collection of Intelligence Information in China. Rescind as obsolete.

. CIG Directive No. 6 - Liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit. Rescind as obsolete.

 ${\tt GIG}$ Directive No. 7 — Survey of Joint, Intelligence Study Publishing Board. Rescind as obsolete.

CIG Directive No. 8 — Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duties with CIG. Reschnded October $k_{\rm p}$ 1916.

CIG Directive No. 9 and Amendment - Devalopment of Intelligence on USSR. Rescind as replaced by NSC intelligence directives.

CIC Directive No. 10 - Index of U.S. Residents' Foreign Intelligence Information. Rescind as replaced by MSC intelligence directives.

CIC Directive No. 11 - Survey of Exploitation of American Business Concerns with Connections abroad as Sources of Foreign Intelligence Information. Rescind as replaced by MSC intelligence directives.

CIG Directive No. 12 - Interim Survey of the Adoquacy of Intelligence Facilities Related to the National Security. Rescind as obsolete

CIG Directive No. 13 - Provision for Coverage of the Foreign Language Press in the United States. Rescind as inoperative.

CIG Directive No. 1h - Reorganization of the Central Intelligence Group. Reschind as obsolete.

CIG Directive No. 15 - Exploitation of american Business Concerns and Scientific, Iducational, and Religious Organizations with Connections Abroad and American Residents Travelling Abroad as Sources of Foreign Intelligence Information. Rescind as replaced by NSC intelligence directives.

Supplemental Directive No. 1 to CIG Directive No. 15 - Rescind as replaced by NSC intelligence directives.

CIG Directive No. 16 - Flan for Coordination of Biographic Intelligence. Rescind as replaced by NSC intelligence directives.

CIG Director No. 17 - Relationship Between the Central Intelligence Group and the State-lar-Navy Coordinating Cormittee. Rescind for replacement by internal CIA Directive.

CIG Directive No. 15 and Amendment - Goordination of Collection Activities. Rescind as replaced by ESC intelligence directives.

R. H. HILLE MODITIR Rear Admiral, USN Director of Central Intelligence

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
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
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

COLMENTS ON AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

THE PROPOSED NEW NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVES

Department of State Comments on the Proposed New NSC Intelligence Directives Replacing Old NIA Directives TAB A - TAB B NSC Dir. #1 - Duties and Responsibilities - TAB C NSC Dir. #2 - Coordination of Overseas Collection Activities NSC Dir. #3 - Goordination of Intelligence Production - TAB D NSC Dir. #4 - Espionage and Counterespionage Operations - TAB E - TAB F NSC Dir. #5 - Atomic Energy Intelligence MSC Dir. #6 - Foreign Wireless and Radio Monitoring - TAB G NSC Dir. #7 - Intelligence for the Research and Development Board - TAB H





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
The proposed new 130 pirectives omit the following provisions, among others, which were included in the ITA Directives and in the ITA Directive proposed in IAE 1/2.

1. NIA Directives 1 and 11 contain provisions for the establishment of an Intelligence Advisory Board to assist the Director of Central Intelligence in coordinating the activities of the several Government intelligence agencies and prescribed methods of procedure for the Board. The new MSC Directives make no provision for the replacement of this Board, which is considered essential for the coordination of interdepartmental intelligence activity. MIA Directives 1 and 11 also make provision for the members of the TAE to express concurrence or non-concurrence in recommendations made by the BOI to the (NIA) MSC. The new MSC Directives do not establish a procedure for this method of transmitting the opinions of the intelligence chiefs, although the DUI suggested the preation of an Intelligence Advisory Committee ir a memorandum to the Departmental Secretarics dated September 19, 1947, which was concurred in by the Secretary of State on October 20, 1947.

2. IAE 1/2 outlines a proposed procedure for the coordination of the production of intelligence.

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This also is believed essential for the coordination of interdepartmental intelligence activity. The proposed new ESC Directives do not contain provision for this coordination.

5. The NIA Directives specified that the Director of Central Intelligence would utilize fully the several Government intelligence agencies in the execution of his responsibility. The proposed new YSC Directives do not make provision to insure proper utilization of the several Government intelligence agencies although paragraph (d)(3), Sec. 102, of the National Security Act states that "the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence."

The proposed new ISS pirectives are at variance with the ISA Directives in several important respects as follows:

1. MSC Directive No. 1.

a. Paragraph I would authorize
the Director of Central Intelligence
to cause the several Departments to
make inspections, surveys, etc.,
without regard to departmental
capabilities or means. The NIA
Directives place the operations of the
intelligence agencies open to the DCI
for inspection in connection with
planning functions and other arrange—

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ments agreed to between the DOI and the respective members of the IAD. In view of this change, paragraph 2 of MSO Directive yo. I would authorize the DOI to request assistance and information from the departments without regard to the capabilities or means of the several departments or without consideration of the distinction between intelligence functions and non-intelligence operational, policy and administrative functions of the departments.


b. Puragraph 3 would assign to the princetor of Central Intelligence and an appropriate member of the Tational Security Council the directive function regulating the constitution and activities of the various intelligence agencies. The NIA Directives, while authorizing the TiB to recommend in this connection, recognize this authority to rest in the several departments. This proposed change is believed to be inconsistent with the intent of the National Security Act.

e. Parsyraph 4 would cause the several intelligence agencies to supply the Gentral Intelligence Agency with all intelligence materials without regard to stipulations

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



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circulated in the PTA Directives, and in the Pational Security Act (Sec. 102, Para. (e)) which provide that the departments will make available to the DCI "such intelligence as relates to the national recurity for correlation, evaluation and dissemination." It is our belief that the CTA should utilize finished intelligence as far as possible, and thus eliminate duplication in processing.

d. Paragraph 5 would authorize the DCI, with approval of the MSC, to cause the issue of CIR and PGD Directives which would have the force of departmental directives. MIA Directive yo. 1 provided that recommendations approved by the "TA would, where applicable, govern the intelligence activities of the separate departments and stated that the members of the IAP would each be responsible for ensuring that approved recommendations were executed within their respective departments. It is believed that the mothod prescribed in the NIA Directives is in accord with the National Security Act and that the proposal incorporated in the new MSC Directive is contrary to the intent of Sec. 101 of the Act and is neither practical nor desirable.

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2. MSC Directive No. 2.

a. The provisions of Paragraph 1 would have the effect of replacing the TAI (IAC) established under the MIA Directives by utilization of unspecified departmental "appropriate representatives" as the means for obtaining departmental concurrence in or dissent from the recommendations of the Director of Gentral Intelligence. It is our belief that a properly designated Board such as the IAE (IAC), which has clearly defined duties and procedures, and which permits joint action by the agencies on common problems, is essential for satisfactory intelligence coordination.

b. Paragraph & proposes a method by which the Director of Central Intelligence would refer cases in which a departmental intelligence chief did not concur, directly to the Secretary of that chief's department. RIA Directive to. Il proposed procedures for forwarding such dissent which are more consonant with the proper relations between an intelligence chief and the head of his department.

c. Paragraph 5 proposes that the Eatlonal Security Council issue directives which would have the force of departmental

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TAE A



directives and which would control
the activities of the several departments
(not necessarily limited to the intelligence agencies of the department). The
NIA Directives, on the other hand, limit
coordinating authority of the CIA with the
IAB to those matters for which the
intelligence chiefs are directly responsible.

d. Paragraph 4 again proposes the utilization of unspecified representatives of the Secretaries of the departments to perform as individuals the functions previously prescribed for the members of the IAE acting jointly.

3. ISO Directive Fo. 3.

a. The proposed Directive, USC No. 3, paragraph 1b, continues the present undefined position of economic and scientific reporting responsibilities and confers upon CIA responsibilities for overt field collection which were not recognized in MIA Directives, and for the allocation of which none of the essential preliminary surveys and investigations of current practice and needs have been made.

4. ISC Directive Ho. 4.

a. Paragraph 1 would establish an outline of national intelligence objectives to serve as a standard guide for the coordinated collection and production of intelligence.

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
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
This provision should be limited to the coordination and production of national intelligence. Paragraph 2 would authorize the Central Intelligence Agency to collaborate with the planners of other arencies in reference to items of subject outline and would authorize the Director of Central Intelligence to establish priorities for the production of intelligence by the agencies. The NIA Directives provided that regulation of priorities, as well as collaboration with planners with reference to intelligence subjects, would be accomplished by the DCI by and through the IAB. The inclusion of such a provision is highly desirable and would assure that objectives and priorities would be in accord with the capabilities and requirements of the departmental intelligence organizations.

5. DOT Directive To. 1/2.

a. The proposed DCI Directive To. 1/2, Atomic Energy Intelligence, makes no reference to the DCI memorandum of Fovember 6, 1947 which modified the application of NTA Directive No. 9, or to the exchange of memoranda between the NTA and the Atomic Energy Commission in July 1947. Without such references, the proposed DCI Directive No. 1/2 does not fully represent the earlier agreed relationship in this field.



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6. DOT Directive To. 1/4.

E. This Directive suthorizes the DCI to coordinate collection, accomplish evaluation, and control the flow of intelligence related to foreign scientific research developments and potentialities. There is no existing NIA Directive on the subject, but the proposal runs counter to existing activities which have operated under the NIA pattern, and to the principles of free inter-agency intelligence exchange which has been the object of all PIA Directives.

7. DCI Directive Fo. 1/5.

a. This Directive proposes that the CTA shall exploit or allocate the exploitation of all captured documents and other foreign documents, including periodicals and the press, and disseminate the product of the exploitation. The FTA Directives recognized that exploitation and dissemination of certain of these documents and periodicals was essential to the activities of the several intelligence agencies. It is our belief that this activity is fundamental to the operation of the departmental intelligence organizations and should be a metter of continuing occuperation.

E. DCI Directive ro. 1/6.

A. This Directive presents as final

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* revision of earlier MIA Directives which is still under consideration in working committees. Two departments have expressed reservations to certain parts of the re-draft. This Directive should, therefore, be returned to the working groups for further consideration and resolution of the disputed problems before presentation to the MSC.

9. DOT Directive ro. 3/1.


- a. Paragraph 1. b.(1) proposes mandatory establishment of a central intelligence index and paragraph 3. b. proposes the coordination with CIA of:
 - Directives implementing or furthering collection procedures or policies, and;
 - (3) Directives assigning collection missions in unallocated fields. This proposal would necessitate reissuance of instructions to the field. It is our belief that, before reissuance of instructions, the DOI should initiate a survey of existing instructions issued under CIP Directive Fo. 18 and make recommendations for changes that may be necessary for full accomplishment of the purposes proposed in USO Directive

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


No. 3. The proposed mandstory establishment of a central intelligence index will, unless qualified, impose an insuperable burden upon the U.S. Foreign Service. Provisions should be made for individual posts to comply according to their capabilities, and for the developing of necessary means and procedures.

13. DOI Directive No. 4/1.

a. This Directive appears to be based on an NIA Directive evolved for a particular Erea. Any such Directives are, in fact, operational guides and should be decigned to meet the specialized problems emisting in the various world areas. The national intelligence objectives as here set out have been prepared without consultation of the dependmental agencies and do not, therefore, represent an integrated intelligence view _ . either on a general or area basis. Furthermore, exercitional Directives of this sort ere within the coordinating jurisdiction of the Director of Central Intelligence, by authority of TST Directives 1, 3 and 4, and chould as a practical mitter be referred to the USD only in pass of dispute at the lovel of the Intelligence Mivisory Committee. It

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is recommended therefore that DCI Directive No. 4/1 be removed from the DCI Directive series.

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PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1 PUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and for the purposes snunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

- l. To maintain the essential relationship of coordination between the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations, an Intelligence Advisory Committee consisting of our respective intelligence chiefs, or their representatives, and the Director of Security and Intelligence of the Atomic Energy Commission, shall be established to advise the Director of Central Intelligence on all recommendations and advice to the NSC relating to paragraphs (d) and (e) cited above, and on all directives of the CIA proposed to implement the Intelligence Directives of the NSC. The Director of Central Intelligence will invite the chief, or his representative, of any other intelligence agency having functions related to the national security to sit with the Intelligence Advisory Committee whenever matters within the purview of his agency are to be discussed.
- 2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall make such surveys, inspections, and investigations of the intelligence operations of the various Federal departments and agencies as he may deem necessary in connection with his duty to advise us and to make recommendations for the coordination of such intelligence activities. As part of his responsibility to advise us, in accordance with paragraph (d) (l) above, he shall make a survey to ascertain what necessary intelligence activities relating to the national security are not being presently performed, or are not being adequately performed, or involve wasteful duplication. On the basis of this survey, he shall advise the Council on the adequacies of the present governmental

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TAB B





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intelligence activities to meet the requirements of both the departments and the Mational Security Council as determined by their several responsibilities and shall suggest to the Council the appropriate advice it should give the President for the correction of any inadequacies in the present departmental and agency intelligence activities. He shall also advise the Council of any wasteful duplication.

- 3. Coordination of intelligence activities should be designed primarily to strengthen the overall governmental intelligence structure by recognizing primary departmental requirements and by supporting the intelligence agencies which directly serve these requirements.
 - a. The Director of Central Intelligence shall, therefore, in making recommendations to the National Security Council for coordination in accordance with paragraph (d) (2) cited shove, transmit with each recommendation a statement indicating the concurrence or non-concurrence of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Recommendations of the Director of Central Intelligence shall, when approved by the National Security Council, issue as Council Directives to the Director of Central Intelligence. Where applicable, these Directives shall also govern the intelligence activities of the several departments and agencies and shall be circulated within the intelligence organizations as orders or directives, superseding all conflicting intelligence orders or directives. The respective intelligence chiefs shall be responsible for insuring that such orders or directives are executed within their intelligence organizations.
 - b. The Director of Central Intelligence shall act for the Mational Security Council, through the Intelligence Advisory Committee, to insure full and proper implementation of Council

MSC Dir. #1 Page 2

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Directives by issuing such supplementary CIA Directives as may be required.

Such implementing directives in which the Intelligence Advisory
Committee concurs unanimously shall be issued by the Director
of Central Intelligence, and shall be binding upon the intelligence
organizations. Where disagreement arises between the Director of
Central Intelligence and one or more members of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee over such directives, the proposed directive,
together with statements of non-concurrence, shall be forwarded
to us for decision.

4. The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in accordance with paragraph d (3) cited above, produce national intelligence; in so doing, he shall not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of the various departments but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities and, in so far as possible, utilize departmental intelligence for such production purposes. Dissemination of such national intelligence as the Director of Central Intelligence may produce shall be to the President, members of the National Security Council and to such governmental departments and agencies as the Mational Security Council from time to time may designate. Mational intelligence so disseminated shall be concurred in by our intelligence agencies or shall carry an agreed statement of substantial dissent.

- a. National intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy, is of concern to more than one department or agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department.
- b. Departmental intelligence is the finished intelligence produced by the various departmental intelligence organizations in carrying out their departmental responsibilities.

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TAB B



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- 5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such intelligence services of common concern to these agencies as will be determined by us. The Director of Central Intelligence shall, as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, recommend to us that he perform for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies such additional intelligence services of common concern as can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.
- 6. The intelligence organizations in each of the departments and agencies shall maintain with the Central Intelligence Agency and with each other as appropriate to their respective responsibilities, a continuing interchange of intelligence available to them. The intelligence files in each intelligence organization including the CIA shall also be made freely available to the others for consultation. In addition thereto, our intelligence organizations within the limits of their capabilities shall provide, or procure, such intelligence as may be requested by the Director of Central Intelligence or by one of the other departments or agencies.
- 7. Because of the interdepartmental character of the Cantral Intelligence Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence will afford our respective departments the opportunity to assign to the Central Intelligence Agency such experienced and qualified officers and members as he may require for advisory, operational, or other purposes, in addition to such personnel as the Director of Central Intelligence may directly employ. In each case, such departmental personnel will be subject to the necessary personnel procedures of each department and in each case it shall be agreed between the Director of Central Intelligence and the chief of the intelligence organization concerned whether the individual will be wholly under the operation and administrative control and

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TAB B





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
direction of the Director of Central Intelligence, or will asset as a representative of his department.

6. The Director of Central Intelligence shall submit annual written reports to us covering expenditures, work, and accomplishments of the Central Intelligence Agency.

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TAB B





PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DISECTIVE NO. 2 COORDINATION OF OVERSEAS COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

The following over-all policies and objectives are established by the Mational Security Council for the interdepartmental coordination of foreign intelligence collection activities to effect sound and efficient utilization of the various departmental overseas collecting and reporting facilities

 Our departments shall be responsible for the collection of foreign intelligence information in accordance with their normal primary interests, as follows:

Political

Department of State

Cultural

Department of State

Sociological

Department of State

Military

Department of the Army

Naval

Department of the Mavy

Air.

Department of the Air Force

Economic Scientific Each agency in accordance with its respective needs, until such time as a definite allocation of responsibilities and interests has been agreed upon.

Technological

2. In order to eliminate the necessity for duplicate reporting from the field, there shall be free and unrestricted interdepartmental exchange of intelligence information and material to meet the recognized secondary needs of each department for intelligence usually collected or prepared by other departments.

3. The senior U.S. representative in each foreign area shall be responsible for the coordination of all collection attivities in his area in accordance with the principles enumerated herein.

a. The collecting and reporting facilities of each of the agencies shall be utilized so as to avoid unproductive and uncoordinated duplication and to insure the full flow of

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TAB C





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intelligence information and material necessary to all departments for the accomplishment of their respective missions.

- b. Intelligence information and material, no matter by whom collected, shall, wherever possible, be transmitted immediately to the field representative of the agency which has primary interest in the subject category.
- g. Full utilization shall be made of individual initiative and favorable contacts of the field representatives of the collecting agencies.
- d. All departmental representatives abroad are individually responsible for insuring that all intelligence information of possible usefulness to the effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission which may come into their possession is reported through appropriate channels.
- 4. The Director of Central Intelligence, acting for the National Security Council, shall cooperate with our several intelligence agencies to insure the full and proper implementation and execution of the above established policies and objectives.

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TAB C





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PROPOSID NATIONAL SUBMITTE SURVEY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR MA. 2

The following over-all policies and objectives are established for the coordination of the production of intelligence.

l. In order that all facilities of the Government may be utilized to their capacity and the responsibilities of each agency may be clearly defined in accordance with its mission, dominant interest and capabilities, the whole field of intelligence production is divided into the following four categories, and responsibilities are allocated as indicated:

a. Basic Intelligence

- (1) Basic intelligence is that factual intelligence which results from the collation of encyclopedic information of a more or less permanent or static nature and general interest which, as a result of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best available.
- (2) An outline of all basic intelligence required by the government shall be prepared by the CIA in collaboration with the appropriate agencies. This outline shall be broken down into chapters, sections, and subsections which shall be allocated as production and maintenance responsing

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bilities to SIA and those agencies of the Government which are best qualified by reason of their intelligence requirements, production capabilities, and dominant interest to assume the production and maintenance responsibility.

- (3) When completed, this outline and tentative allocation of production . and maintenance responsibilities shall be submitted for ISD approval and issued as an implementation of this Directive. It is expected that as the result of constant consultation with the agencies by the Director of Central Intelligence, both the outline and the allocations will be revised from time to time to insure the production of the basic intelligence required by the agencies and the fullest possible use of current agency capabilities. Changes in the outline or allocations shall be effected by agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies concerned.
- (4) This basic intelligence shall be compiled and continuously maintained

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TAP D



in rational Intelligence Surveys to cover foreign countries, areas, or broad special subjects as appropriate. The National Intelligence Surveys will be disceminated in such form as shall be determined by the Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies concerned.

- (5) The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating production and maintenance and for accomplishing the clitting, publication, and dissemination of these National Intelligence Surveys and shall make such requests on the agencies as are necessary for their proper development and maintenance.
- (6) Departments or agencies to be called on for contributions to this undertaking may include agencies other than those represented permanently in the IAD.

b. Current Intellisence

(1) Current intelligence is that spot information or intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs, which is used by them usually without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation.

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- (2) The CIA and the several agercies shall produce and disseminate such current intelligence as may be necessary to meet their own internal requirements or enternal responsibilities.
- (3) Inter-agency dissemination of current intelligence shall be based on inter-agency agreement, including FSC pirective Fo. 1 and the principle of informing all who need to know.

c. Staff Intelligence

- (1) Staff intelligence is that intelligence prepared by any department or agency through the correlation and interpretation of all intelligence materials available to it from all sources, in order to meet its specific requirements and responsibilities.
- (2) Each intelligence agency has
 the ultimate responsibility for the
 preparation of such staff intelligence
 as its own deportment shall require. It
 is recognized that the staff intelligence
 of each of the departments must be broader
 in scope than any allocation of collection
 responsibility or recognition of dominant
 interest might indicate. In fact, the
 full foreign intelligence picture is of
 interest in varying degrees at different
 times to each of the departments.

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- (3) Any intelligence agency, either through the Director of Central Intelligence or directly, may call upon other appropriate agencies for intelligence which does not fall within its own field of dominant interest. Such requests shall be made upon the agencies in accordance with their production capabilities and dominant interest.
- (4) As a part of the coordination program, the Director of Central Intelligence will seek the assistance of the IAB intelligence agencies in minimizing the necessity for any agency to develop intelligence in fields outside its dominant interests.
- (8) The STA and the agencies shall, for purposes of coordination, exclange information on projects and plans for the production of staff intelligence.
- (6) It shall be normal practice that staff intelligence of one agency is available to the other intelligence agencies

 permanently represented on the IAB.

 d. Strategic and Internal Policy Intelligence
- (1) Strategic and Mational Policy Intelligence as defined by the MSS shall benceforth

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be known by the short title "Pational Intelligence."

- (2) The Director of Central
 Intelligence shall produce and disseminate
 national intelligence.
- (5) The Director of Central Intelligence shall plan and develop the production of national intelligence in coordination with the III agencies in order that he may obtain from them within the limits of their capabilities the departmental intelligence which will assist him in the production of national intelligence.
- (4) The Director of Central Intelligrace shall by agreement with the partiacut agency or agencies request and receive such special estimates, reports, and periodic briefs or summaries prepared by the individual departments or agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in accordance with their production capabilities as may be necessary in the production of intelligence reports or estimates undertaken mutually.
- 2. The research facilities required by any agency to process its own current and staff intelligence shall be adequate to satisfy its individual needs after taking full cognizance of the facilities of the other agencies. Tach agency shall endeavor to maintain adequate research facilities, not only to accomplish the intelligence

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TAE D





production two'rs allogated to it directly under the foregoing provisions but also to provide such additional intelligence reports or estimates within its field of dominant intercot as may be necessary to satisfy the requirements of the other agencies under such allocations.

3. For the purposes of intelligence production, the following division of interests, subject to refinement through a continuous program of coordination by the Director of Sentral Intelligence, shall serve at a general delineation of dominant interests:
Political, Cultural, Sociological Intelligence

Dept. of State

ilitary Intelligence

pept. of the Army

Yaval Intelligence

pept, of the ravy

Air Intellisence

Dept. of the Air Force

Economic, Scientific and Technological Intelligence . . .


Each agency in accordance with its respective needs

4. Implementation

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PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITI COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4 ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE OPERATIONS

Under the authority of paragraph 5 of National Security Council Intelligence Directive 1, the Central Intelligence Agency shall:

- 1. Perform all organized Federal espionage and counterespionage operations outside the United States and its Possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national security and to meet the needs of the departments.
- 2. Goordinate the activities abroad of reserve personnel of the Mational Military Establishment employed or otherwise utilized by our departments in other than overt capacities.

When reserve personnel of one department are thus employed or utilized by another department, departmental requirements for reports to representatives of their own department shall be waived.


All other National Security Council Intelligence Directives or implementing supplements shall be construed to apply to intelligence activities other than espionage or counterespionage, unless otherwise specified.

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TAB E





COPY NO. 1

PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY COURCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 5 ATOLIC EMERGY INTELLIGENCE

Under the authority of paragraph (d) of Section 102 of the National Security Act, the Central Intelligence Agency shall:

1. Coordinate the collection of all intelligence information relating to foreign atomic energy development and
potentialities affecting the national security, except that
in certain areas to be specified by the Department of State.
Such collection activities will be undertaken only on the
basis of prior consultation and continuous liaison with
the Department of State.

2. Insure that there is a correct and adequate flow of intelligence material between the Atomic Energy Commission and the departments and other agencies of the Government.

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TAB F





COPY NO. :

PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. fo FOREIGN WIRELESS AND RADIO MONITORING

Under the authority of paragraph (d), Sec. 102, of the National Security Act, the Central Intelligence Agency shall:


- 1. Perform all Federal monitoring and processing of foreign clear text radio broadcasts and such monitoring of foreign wireless transmissions in recognized international codes as are required for the collection of intelligence information related to the national security and to the intelligence requirements of the various departments.
- 2. Disseminate such intelligence information to the various departments and agencies having an authorized

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TAB G



INT 825/3



PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 7 INTELLIGENCE FOR THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD

Under the authority of paragraph (d), Sec. 102, of the National Security Act, the Central Intelligence Agency shall:

- 1. Coordinate the collection of all foreign intelligence related to applied technological information of critical military significance, the disclosure of which would be detrimental to the national security.
- 2. Secure the cooperation of the departments and agencies in the collection of scientific information affecting the national security and in the correlation, evaluation, and appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting intelligence.
- 3. Insure an adequate flow of intelligence material between the Research and Development Board and the departments and other agencies of the Government.

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TAB H



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